PSCRP-BESA Reports No 66 (July 3, 2024)
The June 23 terrorist attacks on Christian and Jewish places of worship in Derbent and Makhachkala have once again drawn attention to Dagestan as one of the centers of radical Islamism in the Russian Federation. The exact number of practicing Muslims in Russia is unknown, but the peoples who traditionally practice Islam (so-called “ethnic Muslims”) make up more than 10% of its population. Islam is traditionally practiced by the titular peoples of 8 republics of the Russian Federation: Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Tatarstan and Chechnya. In all of them, except Adygea, “ethnic Muslims” make up the absolute majority of the population. At the same time, radical Islamism as a phenomenon is a significant factor in the social life of three republics of the North-Eastern Caucasus — Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, where “ethnic Muslims” make up more than 90% of the population.
Ethnic roots of internal political conflicts
Chechnya and Ingushetia are mono-ethnic republics (according to the 2020 census, Chechens make up 96.24% of Chechnya’s population and Ingush comprise 93% of Ingushetia’s population). This is in contrast to Dagestan, a multi-ethnic and multilingual republic in which no single ethnic group constitutes a majority. The very name “Dagestan” is not derived from the name of any ethnicity, but simply means “Mountain Country”. Thus, Islam is, in fact, the main unifying factor for the vast majority of the population of Dagestan. The second unifying factor is the Russian language, which currently serves as the accepted means of interethnic communication among Dagestanis, dominating in the cities, while Russians make up only 3.3% of the republic’s population (2021 census).
The largest ethnic group in Dagestan is the Avars, who together with closely related minorities make up 30.5% of the population of Dagestan (956,800 people according to the 2021 census). The Avars have their own tradition of statehood in the form of the Avar (Khunzan) Khanate, which existed in the XII–XIX centuries, and a sufficiently developed literary language. Imam Shamil (1797–1871), the national hero of the peoples of the North Caucasus, who led their resistance against the Russian conquerors, was an Avar by origin. Avars make up the overwhelming majority of the population of 14 districts of the Republic of Dagestan, as well as the city of Kizilyurt (according to the 2010 census). In two more districts and two more cities, Avars make up a relative majority of the population.
The second largest people in Dagestan are the Dargins, who, together with the closely related minority Kaytags and Kubachins, make up 521.4 thousand people according to the 2021 census (16.6% of the total population) and constitute the vast majority of the population of 4 districts of Dagestan and the city of Izberbash. Unlike the Avars, the Dargins essentially have no state tradition of their own. The Dargin language is broken up into a number of dialects that are far removed from each other.
The language of the third largest ethnic group in the Republic of Dagestan (15.5% according to the 2021 census), the Kumyks, unlike Avar and Dargin languages and the languages of most other peoples of Dagestan, does not belong to the Nakh-Dagestanian language family. The Kumyk language, which in the past played the role of a lingua franca in Dagestan and has a developed literary tradition, is Turkic. The Kumyks have their own state tradition in the form of the Shamkhalate of Tarki, which existed in the XV–XIX centuries. Radish Khan Kaplanov (1883–1937), Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus (MRNC) in 1918–1919, was a Kumyk nobleman by birth.
Kumyks played a leading role in the mass protests of Dagestanis against mobilization into the Russian army in the autumn of 2022, which began when residents of the Kumyk village of Endirey in Khasavyurt district blocked the Khasavyurt — Makhachkala federal highway.
The only other ethnic group whose share in the population of the Republic of Dagestan exceeds 10% are the Lezgins — according to the 2020 census, they numbered 417,000 people in Dagestan (13.3% of the total population). The Lezgins, settled on both sides of the Russian-Azerbaijani border, have long state traditions that date back to the medieval state of Caucasian Albania. In the past, the Lezghin language was widely spoken in Southern Dagestan as a lingua franca. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1989, the Lezgin people’s movement “Sadval” (“Unity”) was established. In December 1991, it initiated a national congress of the Lezgin people, which adopted a declaration on the creation of an independent state of Lezgistan on the lands inhabited by Lezgins on both sides of the Russian-Azerbaijani border. This led to a sharp aggravation of relations between the Lezgin national movement and Azerbaijan. Currently, the Sadval movement is officially recognized as a terrorist organization in Azerbaijan. In the Republic of Dagestan, the Lezgins constitute the overwhelming majority of the population in five districts and a significant minority in another district, the majority of which are closely related Tabasarans. In the city of Derbent they, together with closely related ethnic groups, constitute a majority.
In addition to Avars, Kumyks, Dargins and Lezgins, the Laks (5.2% of the total population), Tabasarans (4% of the total population), Akki Chechens (3.2% of the total population) and Nogais (1.2% of the total population) play a significant role in the ethno-political situation in the Republic of Dagestan. Laks make up the vast majority of the population in the Kulinsky (98.5%, hereinafter — according to the 2010 census) and Laksky (95.2%) districts, and a relative majority (48.51%) in the Novolaksky district. Tabasarans make an absolute majority in Khiva and Tabasaran districts), as well as (together with closely related Lezgins and Aguls) in Dagestan city). Aguls are in the overwhelming majority in Agulsky District (92.54%), and Nogais are in Nogai District (88.21% — according to the 2021 census).
As for Akki Chechens (Aukhs), they do not constitute an absolute majority in any of the districts of Dagestan today. Their greatest concentration is observed in the Novolaksky (27.74% of the population), Khasavyurtovsky (24.86%) and Kazbekovsky (10.16%) districts of Dagestan. All these districts border the Chechen Republic. In 1944 the Akki Chechens, like all other Chechens, were deported by the Soviet authorities to Central Asia. Their lands were settled by Avars and Laks. As a result, after the Akki Chechens returned from exile, a land conflict with a pronounced ethnic coloring arose, which has not been resolved to this day. It is important to emphasize that in the 1990s the Akki Chechens actively supported the declaration of independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, whose military formations invaded Dagestan in 1999. There are still territorial disputes between the Russian-controlled Chechen Republic and the Republic of Dagestan.
The major cities of Dagestan are characterized by a poly-ethnic character with the predominance of the Russian language, despite the fact that Russians in these cities are currently a relatively small minority. For example, in the capital of the republic and its largest city, Makhachkala, 26.7% of the population are Avars, 19.7% are Kumyks, 15.3% are Dargins, 12.71% are Lezgins, 12.35% are Laks, and Russians make up only 5.4% (2010 census data). Only in Kizlyar Russians are a relative majority — 40.49% according to the 2010 census data.
The extremely complex ethnic composition of the population of the economically underdeveloped, subsidized Republic of Dagestan, combined with the high level of ethnic self-consciousness of its peoples and the preservation of many elements of traditional society in their social life, determines a noticeable competition between them. Under the conditions of relatively peaceful coexistence, this competition is expressed primarily in the struggle for positions in the leadership of the power and security structures of the republic (in 2020, President Vladimir Putin appointed Sergei Melikov, a Russified Lezgin born and raised in the Moscow suburbs, as the head of Dagestan), as well as for de facto autonomy within “their” mono-ethnic districts. However, with the deteriorating socio-political situation in the Russian Federation as a whole, inter-ethnic tensions in Dagestan could relatively easily escalate into open inter-ethnic clashes that would resonate outside the republic.
The Jewish dimension of terror and conflict
The ethno-political situation in Dagestan also has a Jewish dimension. The recent attacks on synagogues in Derbent and Makhachkala were not an accident. Ideas of Islamic solidarity, pro-Palestinian and, accordingly, anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish sentiments are widespread in the republic. An additional stimulus for their growth was the war, which in Israel is called Operation Swords of Iron. Suffice it to recall the anti-Semitic riots in Makhachkala on October 29, 2023. At the same time, Mountain Jews are legally one of the indigenous peoples of Dagestan, since their language, Tat, is listed in the constitution of the republic (Chapter 5, Article 1) as one of its official languages. However, unlike other officially recognized indigenous peoples of Dagestan, Jews do not practice Islam.
It is therefore safe to assume that most of the few Jews who still remain in the republic will leave it in the foreseeable future, and the history of Dagestani Jewry, which already lives mainly in Israel, Moscow and Western countries but not in Dagestan, will come to an end.
Derbent has traditionally been the center of Dagestani Jewry. According to the census of 1959, 11,705 Jews lived in this city, which amounted to 24.7% of its population. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to the 1989 census, 13,119 Jews lived in the city, making up 16.9% of the city’s population. According to the 2010 census, there were only 1,345 Jews living in Derbent, which amounted to only 1.1% of the population. So, the trend has been obvious for a long time.
Independent media have suggested that ISIS is behind the recent terrorist attacks in Derbent and Makhachkala. A similar version is promoted by pro-government Russian media.
There is no direct evidence that this is the case, but the terrorists’ modus operandi — attacking symbols of non-Muslim (in this case, Christian and Jewish) presence in a predominantly Muslim country — brings to mind the tactics of ISIS. There is no reason to consider these attacks as actions of a national liberation nature directed against symbols of imperial Russian domination in Dagestan. As has already been said, the Mountain Jews are the original inhabitants of Dagestan, they lived here long before the Russians came. In addition, military bases and police stations are much more suitable as symbols of the imperial Russian presence than Orthodox churches and, even more so, synagogues. It seems that the purpose of these terrorist attacks was to intimidate the non-Muslim population in order to drive them out of Dagestan (although not only the Jewish but also the Christian population of Dagestan has been steadily declining in recent decades).
The population of Dagestan does not have a nationwide, multi-ethnic movement for national independence — Islam is the main factor uniting the vast majority. There is no reason to attribute any specifically ethnic, Dargin nationalist motives to the Dargin terrorists. The fact that the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks were Dargins seems rather coincidental.
The fact that radical Islamist organizations were behind the terrorist attacks in Derbent and Makhachkala is indirectly confirmed by the reaction of the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, whose clan established its power in Russian-occupied Ichkeria not only by fighting the remnants of Ichkerian statehood, but also by fighting armed formations of radical Islamists supported from abroad, who replaced the defeated army of the Republic of Ichkeria. At the same time, in the style of traditional Caucasian society, the head of Chechnya threatened the relatives of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks with blood vengeance, which forced them to publicly apologize for the terrorists’ actions.
However, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that the Russian security services were somehow involved in the recent terrorist attacks in Dagestan as part of some kind of a “long con”. In any case, the Russian authorities will try to use these attacks in their own interests — to strengthen support for Vladimir Putin’s regime, as, in fact, they already did in the first years of his rule.